THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY 1921

Part 1

Preliminary negotiations,

July-October 1921

1. In July de Valera and Lloyd George met four times in London, during which time they failed to secure agreement.

2. The British were prepared to go further than before in offering Dominion status – although this was to be limited in certain ways:

(a) There was to be perpetual free trade between Britain and Ireland.

(b) Ireland was to grant Britain use of its air and naval facilities.

(c) There was to be a limitation on the size of the Irish army and the British could continue voluntary recruitment for its forces in Ireland.

3. De Valera was worried about the unity of Sinn Féin and did not want to be seen to be compromising on the demand for a republic. He concentrated on the partition issue and criticised the British government for its decision to partition Ireland. Lloyd George found talking to de Valera “like trying to pick up mercury with a fork”.

August – September 1921

1. Letters were exchanged between August and September but the central problem remained: how to reconcile de Valera’s concept of full independence with Lloyd George’s insistence that Ireland should remain within the empire.

2. De Valera, at this stage came up with the ingenious and constitutionally brilliant – if difficult – concept of ‘external association’.

3. Under this suggestion Ireland could enjoy the freedom of an independent state but, whilst not being part of the empire, would be ‘externally associated’ with Britain by a sort of special alliance. Britain would not accept this and talks foundered.

Negotiations Begin

1. Eventually Lloyd George invited De Valera to send a delegation to London to hammer out a compromise.

2. In agreeing to go, it can be argued that Sinn Fein had accepted that some form of compromise was going to be the outcome as no pre-conditions were laid down.

3. De Valera had indicated that he did not want to attend. He argued that as ‘President of the Republic’ he was head of state and his symbolic status should not be compromised. He could help to contain any likely opposition from hard-line republicans such as Stack and Brugha if he remained at home.

4. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he knew that some compromise was going to be the outcome and did not want to be tainted by association with that compromise.

5. The Irish delegation was a reluctant Collins, Griffith and Barton from the cabinet. Eamon Duggan and George Gavan Duffy were chosen because of their legal knowledge and Erskine Childers was the Secretary. They were given the status of plenipotentiary but the verbal instructions were to refer home before signing; this ambiguity was to cause havoc.

6. The British delegation consisted of wily and experienced politicians Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Lord Birkenhead and Austen Chamberlain.

Relative Strengths and Weaknesses

1. There was ambiguity surrounding the status of the team as ‘plenipotentiaries’; the written position was that they had full powers to come to agreement with the British – but the verbal instructions suggested that they should refer home before any decisions were made.

2. The Irish delegation was able but divided. Collins was able but considered himself to be a soldier. Brugha personally disliked Collins and plotted against him in his absence.

3. The British team was superbly talented and united in its determination to make Sinn Féin accept Crown and Empire.

4. The British public favoured the idea of a negotiated settlement that meant that Ireland was still in the British Empire and Britain’s defensive requirements would still be met.

5. The British public would support a resumption of war if Sinn Féin insisted on staying outside the Empire.

6. The British were vulnerable on the question of Ulster; the British public would not support a return to war to support the existing border and the Ulster unionists would not compromise anyway. The coercion of Ulster was not an option because the Conservatives would not agree.

THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY 1921 -Part 2

The Main Issues

1. The agreed formula was based on “ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations”

2. What was to be the constitutional status of a new state?

3. What was to be the position of north-east Ulster?

4. What provisions were to be made for British defence and security?

5. The oath of allegiance to the British crown.

6. Minor issues included trade and financial matters.

7. Within these issues the questions revolved around such matters as the possibilities of an independent republic, a unitary state or partition, an oath of allegiance, dominion status, external association, a boundary commission, whether or not this represented a final settlement.

What the British wanted?

1. Their priority was the defence of British territory; they feared that Ireland could be used by an enemy to attack Britain in the future.

2. They wanted to protect the British Empire and avoid giving a boost to independence movements in places like India.

3. Lloyd George could not give too many concessions because he depended on the support of the Conservatives for his coalition and they were close to the unionists.

4. They wanted to protect the Ulster unionists but were willing to put pressure on them if necessary.

5. The British were prepared to accept a wide autonomy for the Irish as long as the King was accepted as nominal head of state.

What the Irish wanted?

1. Their position was less clear.

2. They aimed at Irish unity and an independent republic loosely bound to the Empire and accepting the crown as head of the Empire only but it was not clear how they should compromise on these issues.

3. De Valera proposed the idea of external association, but this has already been rejected by the British.

4. The general strategy of the Irish was, if the need arose, to break off negotiations on the question of Ulster. The British knew that only a breakdown on the imperial question would benefit them and gain the support of the British people.

5. The Irish delegation did not have a clear strategy of how to compromise on their aspirations. They did not have an alternative to external association when the British rejected it and they were vague about what to do with Northern nationalists, especially as partition was now a reality.

The Negotiations

1. Dragged on for two months.

2. For the Irish the question of unity was vital; for the British it was Crown and Commonwealth. The Irish team had been instructed to accept ‘Free State’ for ‘Republic’ and ‘to recognise the King as head of the Commonwealth’ instead of allegiance to the throne.

3. The British defence requirements were met without a problem. Britain secured the naval bases of Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly.

4. For Britain the key point was the oath and Irish allegiance to the crown and dominion status and they were prepared to give Ireland a full measure of autonomy in fiscal and trade matters in order to secure that.

5. For the British the position of external association was incomprehensible and unacceptable.

6. The oath was modified to try to meet Irish sensitivities but, for ardent republicans, the symbolism remained.

7. The British had proposed a Boundary Commission to determine the proper line between Ulster and the rest of Ireland in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. It was assumed that this would involve the transfer of large sections of the partitioned area and this would leave Northern Ireland as too small a political or economic unit.

The End of Negotiations

1. A deadline was set for the end of negotiations – 6^th December 1921.

2. The Irish delegation was divided with Barton, Duffy and Childers opposing any compromise. A visit to Dublin in November made it obvious that De Valera, Brugha and Stack were opposed to any concession.

3. A new formula for the oath was worked out.

4. The question of Irish unity remained and Griffith found himself entrapped into agreeing that Ulster could stay out of a united Ireland if she agreed to a Boundary Commission.

5. Lloyd George then threatened war if the Irish delegates did not agree. His threat worked and the treaty was signed on 6^th December 1921.

6. The unseen participant in all of this was James Craig, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, who had important contacts in the Conservative Party and was determined not to compromise.

7. Collins wrote “I tell you this, early this morning I signed my own death warrant…These signatures are the first real step for Ireland. If only people will remember that – the first real step”.